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The Hart-Scott-Rodino Act: Needing a Second
Opinion About Second Requests
MATTHEW S. BAILEY*
In 1976, Congress enacted the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements
Act (HSR) to enable the Department of Justice (DOJ) and Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) to challenge a merger or acquisition before the
transacting companies become inextricably intertwined. By requiring the
companies to give the federal antitrust agencies advance notice of the
proposed transaction, HSR enables the DOJ and FTC to gather
information, analyze potential antitrust issues, and challenge the deal
before it is consummated.
This Note explores the history and practical consequences of HSR.
Specifically, it analyzes the "Second Request" process for obtaining
additional information and concludes that the federal antitrust agencies
have used the Second Request process as a de facto injunction. This Note
examines the costs and benefits of using the Second Request in this manner,
addresses potential limitations upon agency power, and concludes that
Congress should provide a process of expedited review by a neutral panel
of experts to better approximate congressional intent behind HSR's
enactment.
I. INTRODUCTION
"The sole consistency that I can find is that in [antitrust merger
litigation], the Government always wins."1 Justice Potter Stewart's remark
* J.D., The Ohio State University Moritz College of Law 2006 (expected); B.S.,
Miami University 2005. I would like to thank my parents, Dr. Joe and Linda Bailey, and
my grandmother, Ora Bailey, for their love and support over the years. I would also like
to thank Megan Decker for her never-ending encouragement and patience, as well as the
various professors who drew my attention to this topic and sparked my interest in
business. Finally, the editors and staff of the Ohio State Law Journal deserve special
credit for their assistance in preparing this Note for publication.
I United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 301 (1966) (Stewart, J.,
dissenting) (referencing the government's merger litigation record before the United
States Supreme Court). As noted by Justice Stewart, the government generally "won" on
the issue of liability in antitrust merger litigation before the United States Supreme Court;
however, the government actually failed to achieve an effective remedy for the antitrust
violation in most cases because of the complexity and integration of the merging parties.
Andrew G. Howell, Note, Why Premerger Review Needed Reform-And Still Does, 43
WM. & MARY L. REv. 1703, 1714 (2002) (noting the government's perfect record in
merger litigation before the Warren Court); see also Kenneth G. Elzinga, The Antimerger
Law: Pyrrhic Victories?, 12 J.L. & ECON. 43, 48-51 (1969) (noting the government's
attainment of sufficient relief in only ten of thirty-nine cases, or approximately twenty-
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primarily attacked the federal government's litigation success before the
United States Supreme Court under § 7 of the Clayton Act.2 Congress,
however, unintentionally extended the federal government's merger
regulation success beyond the courtroom when it enacted the Hart-Scott-
Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act (HSR)3 in 1976 by providing an
investigatory mechanism capable of delaying a merger or acquisition
indefinitely.4
HSR provides a procedural mechanism for the two primary federal
antitrust enforcement agencies-the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and
the Department of Justice (DOJ)-to conduct merger investigations. 5 It
addresses the concern that companies become, "in effect, irreversibly
'scrambled' together" once a merger is completed.6 HSR deals with this
concern by requiring each of the merging parties to submit premerger
notification of transactions to the FTC and DOJ.7 Because the FTC and DOJ
need sufficient time and information to accurately assess potential
anticompetitive effects of the transaction and determine whether to seek a
preliminary injunction, HSR also provides a thirty-day automatic stay to
prohibit consummation of the transaction 8 and permits the agencies to submit
a "Request for Additional Information and Documentary Material"
(popularly known as a "Second Request") to obtain additional information
from the merging companies.9
Despite HSR's enactment as merely a procedural mechanism, the FTC
and DOJ quickly shifted merger regulation from a system of review by a
neutral arbiter (the judiciary) to review by the agencies. The agencies
accomplished this power shift by using the HSR Second Request process as a
de facto injunction.' 0 Although powerful antitrust agencies may be desirable,
five percent, during the 1950s). Even when the government was awarded sufficient relief
by the Court, it often took years to implement successfully, that is, unscrambling the egg.
H.R. REP. No. 94-1373, at 8-9 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2572, 2641.
2 Howell, supra note 1, at 1714.
3 Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act, Pub. L. No. 94-435, 90 Stat. 1383
(1976) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 18a (2000)).
4 Unless otherwise noted, "merger" shall not be limited to statutory mergers in this
Note. Rather, it shall be used to encompass a broad range of transactions, including
statutory mergers, stock acquisitions, asset acquisitions, and any other transaction subject
to HSR.
5 See 15 U.S.C. § 18a (2000).
6 H.R. REP. No. 94-1373, at 8.
7 15 U.S.C. § § 18a(a), (d) (2000).
8 Id. § 18a(b). For cash tender offers, the automatic stay is fifteen days. Id.
9 Id. § 18a(e); see also infra notes 65-71 and accompanying text.
10 Joe Sims & Deborah P. Herman, The Effect of Twenty Years of Hart-Scott-Rodino
on Merger Practice: A Case Study in the Law of Unintended Consequences Applied to
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and the premerger notification and automatic stay provisions of HSR may be
necessary for effective enforcement of the federal antitrust laws, the nearly-
unlimited power currently exercised by the agencies1' harms both companies
and consumers. By effectively evading judicial review and unilaterally
imposing substantive judgment on proposed mergers, 12 the agencies impose
direct expenses, timing delays, and continuous disclosure obligations upon
the transacting parties. 13 Moreover, the agencies may be harming
consumers 14 because the possibility of receiving a burdensome Second
Antitrust Legislation, 65 ANTITRUST L.J. 865, 881 (1997) (noting that the FTC and DOJ
have "essentially create[d] the automatic stay of a transaction that the 94th Congress
explicitly refused to grant .... "); see also Edward T. Swaine, "Competition, Not
Competitors," Nor Canards: Ways of Criticizing the Commission, 23 U. PA. J. INT'L
ECON. L. 597, 632 (2002) (asserting that "American companies might be slow to
characterize the HSR process as one susceptible to judicial oversight" because
"[v]oluminous Second Requests" act as "de facto injunctions").
11 There may be budgetary and political constraints upon the agencies' general
activities; however, they do not serve as effective constraints upon the issuance of an
unreasonably burdensome Second Request. While logic dictates that requesting
unnecessary information from merging companies would impose substantial staffing and
storage costs upon the agencies, this is generally untrue because neither the statutes, nor
the regulations promulgated by the agencies, requires staff to review documentation
provided in response to a Second Request. In fact, unopened boxes of information have
allegedly been returned to parties because the agencies simply did not review the
information. See Shirley Johnson, HSR Changes Sharpen Focus on Bigger Deals,
MERGERS & AcQuIsmoNs J., Apr. 1, 2001, at 30. Moreover, the courts have rejected the
notion that agencies are required to review all HSR filings submitted to them. See, e.g.,
SBC Commc'ns, Inc. v. FCC, 56 F.3d 1484, 1496 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (holding that the
FCC, which has concurrent jurisdiction over communications antitrust issues, is not
required to review all HSR filings because "[t]he HSR documents contained millions of
pages; for the Commission to have sorted through all of them would have delayed a
decision on the transfer indefinitely"). Then-Judge Ruth Bader Ginsburg, writing the
majority opinion, characterized the HSR filing requirements as "extensive" and
"voluminous." Id. at 1489, 1496.
12 The issuance of a Second Request has been described as
put[ting] you in preventative detention while [the agencies] beat you with a rubber
hose ... to try to get you to cop a plea bargain .... If you will not agree to the plea
bargain, then you stay in preventative detention for several more months while the
agency tries to persuade a federal judge that you were likely to rob the bank,
whether you knew it or not.
Joe Sims & Michael McFalls, Negotiated Merger Remedies: How Well Do They Solve
Competition Problems?, 69 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 932, 935 (2001).
13 See infra Part IV.
14 See Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209,
224 (1993) (citing Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962)) (noting
that the purpose of the antitrust laws is to protect competition, not competitors, and,
accordingly, rejecting a claim that defendants' predatory pricing scheme violated the
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Request likely prevents or deters companies from proposing procompetitive
mergers, thereby eschewing the generally accepted purpose of tlfi federal
antitrust laws-to encourage competition. 15 As a result, consumers may be
denied the benefits of market efficiencies through lower prices of goods and
services. 16
After the agencies began to use the Second Request as a de facto
injunction, parties attempted to circumvent the injunction by forcing the FTC
or DOJ to file a complaint for a preliminary injunction. 17 Parties may force
agency action by: (1) providing certain documentation in response to a
Second Request investigation; (2) certifying compliance with the Second
Request; and (3) announcing their intention to consummate the transaction in
the near future. 18 While the procedure risks substantial civil penalties for
noncompliance,' 9 causes litigation expenses, and was previously rejected in
court,20 it may be the best alternative for companies that seek faster
antitrust laws). For a discussion on the increased emphasis that the European Union
places on particular competitors, see Swaine, supra note 10, at 597-98.
15 While there have been disagreements about the specific purpose of the antitrust
laws since the enactment of the Sherman Act in 1890, most theorists accept that the
general purpose of the antitrust laws is to protect competition. See ROBERT H. BORK, THE
ANTITRuST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 19-21 (rev. ed. 1993) (claiming
that the general purpose of the Sherman Act was to protect competition by considering
only economic theory); Robert Pitofsky, The Political Content of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L.
REv. 1051, 1075 (1979) (recognizing that the general purpose of protecting competition
is achieved primarily by economic considerations, but claiming that noneconomic
considerations should also factor into the decision-making process); see also Robert H.
Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary Concern of Antitrust: The
Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 65, 67 (1982) (stating that "it is
unanimously agreed that Congress enacted these [federal antitrust] laws to encourage
competition" despite disagreement "over Congress' ultimate goals..." and presenting an
alternative view to those presented by Pitofsky and Bork). The Supreme Court also has
endorsed this proposition. See Brooke Group Ltd., 509 U.S. at 224 (citing Brown Shoe
Co., 370 U.S. at 320) (declaring that the purpose of the federal antitrust laws is to protect
competition, not competitors).
16 See Brooke Group Ltd., 509 U.S. at 224 (considering the effect of an alleged
predatory pricing scheme on consumers).
17 See, e.g., Complaint for Injunctive Relief Pursuant to Section 7A(g)(2) of the
Clayton Act and Section 13(b) of the Federal Trade Commission Act, FTC v.
Blockbuster, Inc., No. 1:05-cv-00463 (D.D.C. Mar. 4, 2005).
18 See id.
19 15 U.S.C. § 18a(g) (2000). Noncompliance with the HSR provisions may result in
an $10,000 fine for each day in which the person or entity violates the statute and
regulations. Id. § 18a(g)(l).
20 See FTC v. McCormick & Co., 1988-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) para. 67,976 (D.D.C.
1988) (ordering McCormick to comply with a Second Request issued by the FTC and
prohibiting consummation of the transaction).
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resolution of the merger review process and question the theoretical and
factual underpinnings of the agencies' antitrust concerns.
This Note examines the Second Request process and concludes that
federal antitrust agencies currently exercise more power than Congress
anticipated when HSR was enacted. Recent moves by the Oracle Corporation
(Oracle) and Blockbuster, Inc. (Blockbuster) 21 are evidence that some
companies believe that the FTC and DOJ are overreaching their bounds and
that certain merger proposals are important enough to their constituents for
them to incur significant litigation costs and exposure to hefty monetary
penalties. Because there are tremendous risks associated with forcing the
agencies to file a complaint, however, Congress should expressly provide a
method for companies to affirmatively challenge the scope of a Second
Request and whether the company achieved "substantial compliance" before
a neutral arbiter. Giving the companies an opportunity to actively challenge
the agencies' Second Requests should help implement the more balanced
investigatory approach originally anticipated by Congress when it enacted
HSR.
Part II of this Note provides an overview of the federal antitrust laws,
specifically focusing on the HSR provisions and statements made by
congressmen during the legislative process. Part II also details the Second
Request process, the agencies' use of Second Requests, and HSR's practical
ramifications for the business world. Benefits of the agencies' current HSR
practice are presented in Part III, while Part IV provides an analysis of the
corresponding costs. Significant attention is given to the unduly burdensome
expenses, timing delays, and disclosure obligations imposed upon
companies, as well as potential costs to consumers. Part V examines the
method by which parties may attempt to circumvent a de facto injunction.
Parts VI and VII examine three possible solutions to the usurpation of
antitrust regulation from the courts, stressing Congress's intent to balance the
interests of the antitrust agencies and potential merger partners. On the one
hand, the agencies require time and information to conduct a thorough,
complex, and accurate investigation. 22 On the other hand, the agencies
should be prevented from imposing unduly burdensome costs on businesses,
thereby encouraging procompetitive mergers and, consequently, benefiting
consumers. Finally, Part VIII concludes that a process of expedited review by
21 See infra notes 162-78 and accompanying text.
22 Antitrust enforcement under the Clayton Act is inherently speculative to some
extent because of its language. William E. Kovacic, Evaluating Antitrust Experiments:
Using Ex Post Assessments of Government Enforcement Decisions to Inform Competition
Policy, 9 GEO. MASON L. REv. 843, 846 n.9 (2001) (referring to Section 7 of the Clayton
Act, which prohibits certain transactions whose effect "may be substantially to lessen
competition, or to tend to create a monopoly") (emphasis added).
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a panel of experts, with a clear and convincing burden of proof placed on the
defendants to show that a Second Request is unduly burdensome, better
approximates the congressional intent behind HSR's enactment.
II. THE PATH FROM JUDICIAL REVIEW TO ADMINISTRATIVE
REGULATION
A. Federal Antitrust Laws
On July 2, 1890, President Benjamin Harrison signed the first major
piece of federal antitrust legislation into law--the Sherman Act.23 The
Sherman Act established an enforcement mechanism that included judicial
review of any "contract, combination ... , [and] conspiracy, in restraint of
trade," and imposed both criminal and civil penalties for unlawful
restraints.24 Between 1890 and 1914, the government successfully litigated
several important cases under the general language of the Sherman Act;
25
23 Sherman Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§ § 1-7 (2000)). Prior to this date, two state-level restrictions indirectly limited business
associations. See D.T. ARMENTANO, THE MYTHS OF ANTITRUST: ECONOMIC THEORY AND
LEGAL CASES 75 (1972). First, states often imposed taxes on individuals that owned stock
in out-of-state corporations. Id. Second, states often prohibited corporations from owning
stock in other corporations. Id. Creative business executives, however, eventually
developed "trusts" that effectively evaded these state restrictions. See id. Once these
trusts became prevalent, "widespread discontent with business" necessitated
congressional attention. THE ANTITRUST REVOLUTION: ECONOMICS, COMPETITION, AND
POLICY 1 (John E. Kwoka, Jr. & Lawrence J. White eds., 4th ed. 2004) [hereinafter
ANTITRUST REVOLUTION]; see also Howell, supra note 1, at 1708-09. The trusts were
also relatively large. For example, at least one trust was valued at nearly one billion
dollars by 1901, THOMAS J. MISA, A NATION OF STEEL: THE MAKING OF MODERN
AMERICA 1865-1925, at 166 (1995) (referencing the organization of U.S. Steel)--nearly
the budget of the entire federal government only a few years earlier. T.B. Reed, Spending
Public Money, 154 N. AMER. REV. 319, 319 (1892). Congress quickly responded by
enacting the Sherman Act.
24 15 U.S.C. § § 1-7 (2000).
25 See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 59-62 (1911) (holding
that only unreasonable restraints of trade were proscribed by the Sherman Act, but
ultimately finding that the defendants engaged in illegal restraints of trade in the
petroleum industry). This historic antitrust case established the "Rule of Reason," id. at
62-63, as the legal standard for determining whether there has been a violation of the
Sherman Act, which, some have argued, made inconsistent enforcement of the Sherman
Act inevitable. See Thomas C. Arthur, A Workable Rule of Reason: A Less Ambitious
Antitrust Role for the Federal Courts, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 337, 341-46 (2000). The Rule
of Reason generally condemns unreasonable restraints of trade. See Standard Oil, 221
U.S. at 62-63.
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however, it was unsuccessful nearly 40% of the time, partially because of the
Supreme Court's holding in Standard Oil Co. v. United States that only
"unreasonable" restraints of trade were proscribed by § 1 of the Sherman
Act.26
After public discontent with businesses facilitated President Woodrow
Wilson's election (antitrust platform), 27 Congress enacted the Federal Trade
Commission Act 28 and the Clayton Act29 to strengthen antitrust enforcement,
especially in the context of mergers and acquisitions. The FTC Act
established the Federal Trade Commission as an independent federal agency
to review trade practices and conferred the authority to issue cease-and-desist
orders when the agency determined that a company was engaged in unfair
trade practices. 30 The primary effect of the Clayton Act, on the other hand,
was to update the Sherman Act's prohibition on illegal restraints of trade
with respect to certain practices-for example, mergers, local price
discrimination, exclusive dealing contracts, tying contracts, and interlocking
directorates-because of the uncertainty associated with the standards of
review utilized by the courts. 31 In essence, it more specifically defined the
"Rule of Reason" established by the Supreme Court as the standard of review
for these arrangements in Standard Oil.32 Section 7, for example, prohibits
mergers whose effect "may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend
to create a monopoly." 33
Until 1976, courts were the final arbiters of alleged antitrust merger
violations. During this period, litigation generally arose in two broad
contexts: (1) "horizontal" transactions between actual or potential rivals, 34
and (2) "vertical" transactions between suppliers and customers. 35 While the
2 6 See HOUSE SELECT COMM. ON SMALL BUSINESS, CONGRESS AND THE MONOPOLY
PROBLEM: FIFTY-SIx YEARS OF ANTITRUST DEVELOPMENT, 1900-1956, H.R. Doc No.
85-240, at 659 (1957).
27 Howell, supra note 1, at 1712.
28 15 U.S.C. § § 41-51 (2000).
29 Id. § § 12-27, 44; 28 U.S.C. § 52 (2000).
30 15 U.S.C. § § 41-51 (2000).
31 Id. § § 12-27, 44; 28 U.S.C. § 52 (2000).
32 ROGER SHERMAN, ANTITRUST POLICIES AND ISSUES 39 (1978) ("The Clayton Act
could be seen as an effort to define unreasonable behavior more specifically to make it
easier to prove, thereby harnessing the rule of reason to good effect.").
33 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2000).
34 See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 334 (1962) (describing
horizontal transactions as "[a]n economic arrangement between companies performing
similar functions in the production or sale of comparable goods or services").
35 See id. at 323-24 (describing vertical transactions as "[e]conomic arrangements
between companies standing in a supplier-customer relationship").
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administrative agencies made the initial determination as to whether a
transaction or trade practice should be challenged, courts provided the
ultimate substantive review and declined to enjoin a transaction unless the
agency responsible for its review established that the probable effect of the
activity or transaction was to substantially lessen competition or create a
monopoly, often by demonstrating that it would result in higher prices or
reduced innovation.36 If the agency failed to meet its burden, the activity or
transaction could proceed. 37 This process of judicial review, however,
changed dramatically with the passage of HSR, when the FTC and DOJ
began using the HSR premerger notification process to effectively
"eviscerate[] judicial review of merger policy." 38
B. Hart-Scott-Rodino and Second Request Investigations
1. Statutory and Regulatory Authority
The provisions of HSR provide a relatively straightforward mandate that
certain transactions be reported to the federal antitrust agencies prior to
consummation of a deal.39 The provisions, as enacted, balance the needs of
the federal antitrust agencies and the transacting parties by, among other
things, requiring premerger notification of certain transactions and their
major elements, and expressly requiring only "substantial compliance" with
agency requests and limiting time periods for review.
40
Subject to limited exceptions, when a transaction exceeds certain value
thresholds, parties are required to notify the Antitrust Division of the DOJ
36 See United States v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486, 501-02 (1974)
(rejecting the government's claim that evidence of past coal production was highly
relevant in determining possible future anticompetitive effects of a proposed merger
because of the prevalence of long-term supply contracts); see also Sims & McFalls, supra
note 12, at 932 n.1 (noting that "[t]o obtain injunctive relief, antitrust enforcement
agencies must show... anticompetitive effects in the marketplace through higher prices
or reduced innovation").
37 See Gen. Dynamics, 415 U.S. at 501-02.
38 Ashutosh Bhagwat, Modes of Regulatory Enforcement and the Problem of
Administrative Discretion, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 1275, 1298 (1999) (citing Sims & Herman,
supra note 10, at 897-98 & n.96) (describing the unintended effects of HSR legislation,
the coercive nature of the agencies' use of Second Requests, and the problems associated
with ex ante regulation of merger proposals). But see William J. Baer, Reflections on
Twenty Years of Merger Enforcement Under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act, 65 ANTITRUST
L.J. 825, 849-52 (1997) (claiming that the FTC and DOJ have not utilized the HSR
provisions in a coercive manner that usurps substantive merger review from the courts).




and the Bureau of Competition of the FTC of the proposed merger or
acquisition.4 1 As amended by the HSR Reform Act of 2000,42 HSR generally
requires premerger filing when: (1) at least one party to the transaction is
engaged in commerce or an activity affecting commerce, and (2) when the
size of the transaction exceeds $200 million (commonly known as the "size-
of-transaction test").43 When the size of the transaction does not exceed $200
million, but is in excess of $50 million, premerger filing is generally required
if one party has at least $10 million in sales or assets, and the other party has
at least $100 million in sales or assets44-commonly referred to as the "size-
of-person test."'45
HSR provides exemptions from the filing requirement 46 and the antitrust
agencies have exempted several other transactions in the regulations. 47 These
exemptions include: transactions in the ordinary course of business; 48
acquisitions of certain nonvoting securities; 49 certain acquisitions of voting
securities by a majority shareholder; 50 relatively small acquisitions (less than
10% of the outstanding voting securities) for investment purposes only;5 1
acquisitions of voting securities that do not increase, directly or indirectly,
the acquiring person's proportionate share of the outstanding voting
securities; 52 and certain investments by banks, banking associations, trust
companies, investment companies, and insurance companies. 53
When a company qualifies for mandatory reporting under the HSR Act,
however, it must submit a Notification and Report Form 54 to both antitrust
41 Id. § 18a(a) (2000); 16 C.F.R. § § 801-803 (2005).
42 H.R. 5548, 106th Cong. § 630 (2000) (enacted into law by Pub. L. 106-553,
§ l(a)(2), 114 Stat. 2762 (2000)).
43 15 U.S.C. § 18a(a) (2000); Howell, supra note 1, at 1715 n.87. Several
exemptions from the premerger notice requirement exist in the regulations promulgated
by the agencies. See 16 C.F.R. § 802 (2005).
44 15 U.S.C. § 18a(a) (2000).
45 See Howell, supra note 1, at 1723.
46 See 15 U.S.C. § 18a(c) (2000).
47 See 16 C.F.R. § 802 (2005).
48 15 U.S.C. § 18a(c)(1) (2000); 16 C.F.R. § 802.1 (2005).
49 15 U.S.C. § 18a(c)(2) (2000).
50 15 U.S.C. § 18a(c)(3) (2000); 16 C.F.R. § 802.30 (2005).
51 15 U.S.C. § 18a(c)(9) (2000); 16 C.F.R. § 802.9 (2005).
52 15 U.S.C. § 18a(c)(10) (2000); 16 C.F.R. § 802.10 (2005).
53 15 U.S.C. § 18a(c)(1 1) (2000); 16 C.F.R. § § 802.53-64 (2005).
54 16 C.F.R. § 803 app. (2005). The standardized form is also available at the FTC's
website (http://www.ftc.gov).
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agencies, and the acquiring party must pay a filing fee. 55 If the transaction is
not a negotiated deal (e.g., a hostile tender offer), the acquiring party must
notify the target prior to filing the premerger notice with the FTC. After
notification, the target must file documents within ten to fifteen days,
depending on the transaction. 56
The initial Notification and Report Form is a fifteen-page document that
may require additional attachments depending on the complexity of the
parties and of the transaction. 57 The form contains basic information about
the parties and structure of the merger proposal.58 It also requires Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) filings, financial statements, sales revenue
information for each industry and product, information about prior
relationships between the parties, and other information about the relevant
geographical market.59 One of the most contentious filing requirements is the
submission of Item 4(c) documents, otherwise known as studies, surveys,
analyses, and reports prepared by or for any officer or director in relation to
the transaction.60
Once the premerger notice has been filed with both agencies, a thirty-day
statutory waiting period (fifteen days for cash tender offers or the purchase of
assets in a bankruptcy proceeding) prohibits consummation of the
transaction.61 During the waiting period, the FTC and DOJ staffs review the
information provided in the Notification and Report Form to determine if
further investigation is needed to assess whether there may be a violation of
the federal antitrust laws.62 Many transactions reported under HSR do not
55 16 C.F.R. § 803.9 (2005). Depending on the size of the transaction, the original
filing fee ranged from $45,000 to $280,000. Id.
56 16 C.F.R. § 801.30(b) (2005).
57 See id. § 803 app. The government estimates that compliance time for the initial
Notification and Report Form varies from 8 to 160 hours, with an average response time
of 39 hours. Id. The estimate, however, only includes the initial filing; second request
compliance time is not included.
58 Id.
59 Id.
60 Id. For an example of the significant penalties associated with the failure to file
Item 4(c) documents, see United States v. Automatic Data Processing, Inc., 1996-1 Trade
Cas. (CCH) para. 71,361 (D.D.C. 1996) (imposing a civil penalty of $2.97 million for
failing to file all the relevant Item 4(c) documents). See also United States v. Blackstone
Capital Partners II Merchant Banking Fund L.P., 1999-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) para. 72,484
(D.D.C. 1999) (entering consent judgment against an individual as well as against the
entity for failing to file Item 4(c) documents).
61 15 U.S.C. § 18a(b) (2000); 11 U.S.C. § 363(b)(2) (2000); 16 C.F.R. § 803.10
(2005).
6 2 AMERiCAN BAR ASSOCIATION, THE MERGER REVIEW PROCESS: A STEP-BY-STEP
GUIDE TO FEDERAL MERGER REVIEW 117 (Ilene K. Gotts ed., 2d ed. 2001). Each of the
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require additional investigation, and, therefore, the agencies will often grant
early termination of the statutory waiting period.63 When either the FTC or
DOJ determines that there are potential anticompetitive effects of the merger
or acquisition, however, there is a "clearance" procedure for determining
which agency will be responsible for further investigation and the additional
investigation will then proceed.64
Additional investigation is achieved through the issuance of a "Request
for Additional Information and Documentary Material," commonly known as
a Second Request.6 5 A Second Request achieves two agency goals:
(1) obtaining information about potential anticompetitive effects, and
(2) maintaining the status quo until the decision of whether to seek injunctive
relief is made. 66 Once an agency issues a Second Request, a statutory thirty-
day automatic stay applies and does not begin to toll until parties have
substantially complied with the Second Request. 67 Substantial compliance
implies less than full compliance. According to the agencies, however,
"substantial compliance" is nothing less than full compliance. 68
In 1995, the FTC and DOJ jointly drafted a Model Second Request that
may be used by agency staff to determine whether the agencies should seek
an injunction or enter negotiations for a consent decree.69 The agencies
generally encourage staff members to use the Model Second Request and to
modify it depending on the details of the particular transaction 70 because it is
broad in scope and requires extensive amounts of detailed information. 71
agencies has established procedures for reviewing the HSR filings that may differ from
the other agency. Id. at 117-25.
63 15 U.S.C. § 18a(b)(2) (2000) (permitting the agencies to grant early termination
of HSR investigations).
64 AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, supra note 62, at 117.
65 15 U.S.C. § 18a(e) (2000); 16 C.F.R. § 803.20(c) (2005).
66 AMERICAN BAR AssOCIATION, supra note 62, at 137.
67 15 U.S.C. § 18a(e) (2000); 16 C.F.R. § 803.20(c) (2005). For tender offers and
bankruptcy acquisitions, the automatic stay is ten days, rather than thirty days. Id.
68 FTC Statement of Basis and Purpose, 43 Fed. Reg. 33,508 (July 31, 1978) (stating
that "[a]nything less than a complete response [to a Second Request] is not substantial
compliance").
69 Federal Trade Commission & U.S. Department of Justice, Model Request for
Additional Information and Documentary Material, Hart-Scott-Rodino Premerger
Program Improvements (Mar. 23, 1995), reprinted in 6 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 42,521
(Mar. 28, 1995), also available at http://www.ftc.gov/bc/modelguide.htm [hereinafter
Model Second Request].
70 Federal Trade Commission, Guidance for Federal Merger Investigations and
Complying with "Second Requests," Section V(E)(3), Dec. 2000, available at
http://www.ftc.gov/bc/bestpractices/mergerguidelines.pdf ("Staff should be forthcoming
about the issues of concern. Because the scope of second requests is often broad, staff
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2. Congressional Intent
Congress enacted HSR in 1976 to strengthen antitrust enforcement. 72 It
recognized that, despite the antitrust agencies' litigation success on the issue
of liability,73 the agencies were often unable to obtain adequate relief in these
cases, because the transactions were so complex that they were "difficult at
best, and frequently impossible" to "unscramble" after consummation. 74
Congress, however, did not intend to confer unlimited review power upon the
agencies. For example, Congressman Rodino, one of the bill's primary
sponsors, cautioned that the premerger notification provisions of HSR were
intended to apply only to "the very largest corporate mergers-about the 150
largest out of the thousands that take place every year." 75 Congressmen
believed that HSR would provide the antitrust agencies with sufficient
advance notice of these complex deals and readily available information to
enable the agencies to quickly analyze the merger proposals for any potential
anticompetitive effects and determine whether seeking injunctive relief from
the courts was justified.76 Essentially, the premerger notification process
enabled the agencies, with approval of the courts, to halt the transaction
before the merging firms' assets, operations, and management were, "in
effect, irreversibly 'scrambled' together." 77
should be willing to modify requests that are not likely to be relevant to the investigation
or resolution of staff's concerns.").
71 Id. (noting that the scope is often "broad"); Model Second Request, supra note 69,
at 1-5. See infra notes 121-26 and accompanying text.
72 See Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act, Pub. L. No. 94-435, 90 Stat.
1383 (1976) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 18a (2000)).
73 See United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 301 (1966) (Stewart, J.,
dissenting) (noting that, before the Warren Court, the government always prevailed on
the issue of liability in merger litigation).
74 H.R. REP. No. 94-1373, at 8 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2572,
2640-41.
75 Id. at 11; see Sims & Herman, supra note 10, at 877-78 (noting that congressional
statements clearly indicated the limited applicability of the HSR provisions to the largest
transactions). Joe Sims is a former Deputy Assistant Attorney General in the Antitrust
Division of the DOJ from 1974-1978 and participated extensively in the negotiations and
deliberations on the provisions of HSR. Id. at 865 n.3. Although some of the authors'
concerns expressed in the article may have been somewhat alleviated with the 2000
amendments to the HSR Act, the main proposition of the article-that the HSR has been
utilized against congressional intent and is still in need of reform-is still supported. See,
e.g., Bhagwat, supra note 38, at 1322-24; Howell, supra note 1, at 1745.
76 Sims & Herman, supra note 10, at 877-79.
77 H.R. REP. No. 94-1373, at 8 (1976).
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Notably absent from HSR was a permanent automatic stay provision.
Members of the Senate, 78 the House of Representatives, 79 the agencies, 80 and
the business world, 81 all opposed a statutory provision that would have
enabled unilateral agency enforcement. 82  Accordingly, a permanent
automatic stay provision that was originally included in the HSR bill was
removed before leaving the Senate.83 Even subsequent review by a federal
court was rejected as being sufficient protection against overenforcement by
the agencies if they had the capability to impose an automatic stay.84
Because the initial premerger notice submitted by the parties contains
limited types of information, 85 Congress recognized that further factual
investigation may be needed to assess the antitrust implications of certain
mergers and, therefore, provided the Second Request process to obtain a
"reasonable" amount of additional information.86 Representative Rodino, in
the Conference Report for the bill, noted that "the Government will be
78 See, e.g., 122 CoNG. REc. 16,911, 16,915 (1976) (statement of Sen. McClure,
rejecting an automatic stay provision because "arbitrary and absolute enforcement agency
power to stop and kill business transactions which are not inherently unlawful is at war
with the most fundamental traditions of our jurisprudence"); id. at 17,563 (statement of
Sen. Hruska, rejecting an automatic stay provision because "it is anathema, and that is to
speak of it as charitably as possible, because it would have fixed in the hands of an
individual within the [DOJ] the capability and the potential of prohibiting any and all
mergers upon which he would cast a baleful eye").
79 Id. at 25,052 (statement of Rep. Rodino that "[the] bill makes no changes in the
substantive law of mergers"); id. (statement of Rep. Hughes: "I wish to stress that the
legislation makes procedural, rather than substantive changes in the Nation's antitrust
laws"); id. at 25,055 (statement of Rep. McClory: "This bill does not change the
substance of the merger law at all").
80 Id. at 16,911, 16,916 (statement of Deputy Attorney General Tyler that "[t]he
administration does not support enactment of [a] premerger stay provision"); id
(statement by FTC Chairman Engman) ("[W]e think the burden should be on us to make
the challenge. Rather than mandating a court, upon application of the enforcement
agency, to enter an order prohibiting consummation of a merger pending final judgment,
the law should permit a court to require a showing by the Government of probable
illegality.") (emphasis omitted).
81 Sims & Herman, supra note 10, at 875 (characterizing the business community's
response to the provisions as "vehemently opposed").
82 Id. at 874-76.
83 122 CONG. REc. 17,426 (1976); Sims & Herman, supra note 10, at 874-76.
84 Sims & Herman, supra note 10, at 874-76 (noting that the original HSR
provisions included an automatic stay provision that could be challenged in court, with
the burden of proof on the defendant to show that the preliminary injunction was
wrongfully imposed).
85 See supra notes 57-63 and accompanying text.
86 122 CONG. REc. 30,877 (1976) (statement of Rep. Rodino).
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requesting the very data that is already available to the merging parties, and
has already been assembled and analyzed by them."' 87 As a result, the
"substantial compliance" requirement was expressly incorporated into the
statute88 to limit the amount of information requested by the FTC and DOJ
during a Second Request. During congressional discussions, Representative
Rodino further noted:
[L]engthy delays and extended searches should.., be rare. It was, after all,
the prospect of protracted delays of many months-which might effectively
"kill" most mergers-which led to the deletion.., of the "automatic stay"
provisions originally contained in both bills. To interpret the requirement of
substantial compliance so as to reverse this clear legislative determination
would clearly constitute a misinterpretation of this bill.89
3. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission
Implementation
Within two years, the agencies determined that "[a]nything less than a
complete response [to a Second Request] is not substantial compliance." 90
The agencies also concluded that the second statutory waiting period-
automatically imposed upon the issuance of a Second Request-does not
begin to run until the agencies themselves determine that the companies
involved have substantially complied with the Second Request.91 The
combination of these rules, promulgated by the FTC and DOJ, effectively
bestows upon the agencies the power to unilaterally issue, without
subsequent review by a court or any other neutral arbiter, an automatic stay
indefinitely for any transaction qualifying for advance notice under HSR.92
This extraordinary block of power was explicitly rejected by Congress93
when it enacted HSR and was even deemed inappropriate by senior officials
within both agencies during congressional hearings.94 Because the agencies
subsequently asserted the very power they once rejected, judicially crafted
87 Id. (emphasis added).
88 15 U.S.C. § 18a(g)(2) (2000); see also supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text.
89 122 CONG. REc. 30,877 (1976).
90 FTC Statement of Basis and Purpose, 43 Fed. Reg. 33,508 (July 31, 1978).
91 16 C.F.R. § 803.10(c)(2) (2005).
92 Sims & Herman, supra note 10, at 881.
93 See supra notes 78-84 and accompanying text; see also Sims & Herman, supra
note 10, at 881.
94 See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
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"merger enforcement" has been unilaterally replaced by a privatized 95
scheme of administrative "merger regulation."96 Within the past decade, even
Supreme Court opinions considering substantive merger and acquisition
enforcement issues have been "widely" characterized as "obsolete." 97 In
essence, agency guidelines "now enjoy considerably greater stature than the
case law" 98 and merging parties are forced to consider whether a proposed
95 Warren S. Grimes, Transparency in Federal Antitrust, 51 BUFF. L. REV. 937, 943
(citing Thomas M. Jorde, Coping with the Merger Guidelines and the Government's
"Fix-It-First" Approach: A Modest Appeal for More Information, 32 ANTITRUST BULL.
579, 594 (1987)) (describing the consolidation of HSR practice by a few firms, primarily
in Washington D.C. and New York, as creating a "barrier to knowledge... that can
foster an elitist and difficult-to-enter specialty within the private bar"). The barriers to
knowledge are largely attributable to the HSR provisions that require confidentiality of
submitted documents in a large number of instances:
Any information or documentary material filed with the Assistant Attorney General
or the Federal Trade Commission pursuant to this section shall be exempt from
disclosure under section 552 of title 5, United States Code, and no such information
or documentary material may be made public, except as may be relevant to any
administrative or judicial action or proceeding.
15 U.S.C. § 18a(h) (2000). Disclosure, however, may be made to a committee or
subcommittee of Congress. Id. Consequently, attorneys with prior experience with HSR
filings are, understandably, sought for their personal experience, resulting in a
concentration of the HSR practice in a relatively small number of law firms.
96 Sims & McFalls, supra note 12, at 934 (noting the deliberate use of the term
"merger regulation" to characterize the DOJ and FTCs' exercise of power in considering
the anticompetitive effects of proposed mergers and acquisitions because the current
practice resembles standard economic regulation more than traditional law enforcement);
Sims & Herman, supra note 10, at 865 (stating that the HSR is "the most important factor
in the replacement of merger control through litigation with a comprehensive scheme of
merger regulation"); Grimes, supra note 95, at 939 (criticizing the HSR and subsequent
acts by the DOJ and FTC for greatly reducing the "transparency" of merger review by
privatizing antitrust law).
97 Daniel J. Gifford, The Jurisprudence of Antitrust, 48 SMU L. REV. 1677, 1680
(1995) (claiming that Supreme Court precedents regarding substantive merger issues
"embrace archaic positions which are widely recognized as no longer valid"); see also
ANTITRUST REVOLUTION, supra note 23, at 14 (noting that the Supreme Court has not
decided a case involving a government challenge to a merger since 1974).
98 Spencer Weber Waller, Prosecution by Regulation: The Changing Nature of
Antitrust Enforcement, 77 OR. L. REV. 1383, 1404 (1998) (discussing the importance of
the agencies' published guidelines as being the most influential force on antitrust law,
primarily due to the importance of obtaining "prompt clearance" by the governmental
agencies). Substantive merger issues have not been decided by the Supreme Court since
the enactment of HSR in 1976. See id. at 1424-25 (discussing the less prominent role of
Supreme Court opinions in antitrust law, not only in merger enforcement, but across the
board); Scott A. Sher, Closed but Not Forgotten: Government Review of Consummated
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transaction will please the current staff and officials of the FTC and DOJ,99
rather than the judiciary's interpretation of the law.
Initially conceived as a means for obtaining readily available information
when the initial HSR filings indicate an increased likelihood of an antitrust
violation, 100 the Second Request process has blossomed into a de facto
injunction. 10 1 This utilization of the Second Request process clearly has
benefits, as well as significant costs.
III. BENEFITS OF THE CURRENT SYSTEM
The current system of merger regulation by the antitrust agencies
provides several benefits. 10 2 "Premerger notific[a]tion is not an end in itself.
Its value lies in its demonstrated ability to improve our substantive review of
mergers under the Clayton Act."'1 3 The value of the HSR Second Request
process, therefore, may be considered in relation to the agencies' ability to
substantively review and challenge mergers and acquisitions with potentially
anticompetitive effects. The HSR provisions create value in this context in
three general ways: (1) advance notice of complex transactions preserves
adequate relief for the government when it successfully prosecutes a case,
Mergers Under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 45 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 41, 55-95 (2004)
(discussing the various ways in which case law relating to Section 7 of the Clayton Act is
outdated); see also United States v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486, 486 (1974).
99 A. Douglas Melamed, Antitrust: The New Regulation, ANTITRUST, Fall 1995, at
13.
100See 122 CONG. REc. 30,877 (1976) (regarding the purpose of the HSR Act,
according to one of its primary sponsors).
101 Sims & Herman, supra note 10, at 881 (explaining that burdensome Second
Requests issued by the agencies often serve as de facto injunctions, which prohibit
consummation of the proposed transaction indefinitely).
102 For an extensive discussion of the benefits of the current merger regulation
practices by the FTC and DOJ, see Baer, supra note 38, at 825-62. Baer is a former
Director of the Bureau of Competition of the Federal Trade Commission. In the article,
Baer defends the current practices of the agencies, including their utilization of the HSR
Second Request, by reviewing twenty years of enforcement under the HSR provisions.
He concludes that the presence of the HSR provisions and their employment are more
beneficial to the national interests in preventing anticompetitive mergers and acquisitions
than they are detrimental to the various actors. But see Sims & Herman, supra note 10, at
865-69 (rejecting the position of Baer, and claiming that major reform of various
portions of the HSR, including the Second Request procedure, is necessary).
103 James W. Mullenix, The Premerger Notification Program at the Federal Trade
Commission, 57 ANTITRUST L.J. 125, 130-31 (1988) (discussing the importance of
premerger notification in the enforcement of the antitrust laws).
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because the firms are not already inextricably intertwined; 0 4 (2) statutory
waiting pe. ods provide time for a more thorough and accurate analysis of
the antitrust implications; 105 and (3) ex ante regulation and discovery reduces
the time and expenses associated with post-acquisition litigation. 106 Along
these lines, increased agency bargaining leverage 107 and more extensive
discovery than provided by normal discovery processes under the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure 108 may also benefit consumers. 109
According to the FTC and DOJ, merger review by the agencies
substantially benefits consumers. For example, in 1999 alone, the staff and
senior officials of the two agencies reported a consumer110 benefit of $5.2
billion.111 Although these estimates are inherently speculative, they do not
measure the net benefit conferred by the agencies' use of the Second Request
10 4 See FED. TRADE COMM'N, THE TwENTY-SECOND ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS




107 Sims & McFalls, supra note 12, at 935-36 (acknowledging the institutional
benefits of increased bargaining leverage, from the perspective of the agencies).
108 Sims & Herman, supra note 10, at 881-82 (citing Malcolm R. Pfunder,
Premerger Notification After One Year: An FTC Staff Perspective, 48 ANTITRUST L.J.
1471, 1496 (1979)) (noting that the government's discovery is limited by court review
under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, but that it may be unlimited, and forced,
under the guise of a Second Request). Malcolm Pfunder drafted many of the HSR
regulations promulgated by the agencies, and commented at their inception: "It is my
impression that the government is able to obtain more and better information more
quickly under Hart-Scott-Rodino than it could using conventional discovery techniques."
Malcolm R. Pfunder, Premerger Notification After One Year: An FTC Staff Perspective,
48 ANTITRUST L.J. 1471, 1496 (1979).
109 It is debatable whether governmental avoidance of established procedures can
properly be considered a benefit, especially when the increase in bargaining leverage and
discovery is often criticized as overenforcement. See, e.g., Joe Sims, Appraising DOJ's
New Initiative for Pre-Merger Review, LEGAL BACKGROUNDER, Feb. 8, 2002, at 3.
110 William Baer, former Director of the Bureau of Competition of the Federal
Trade Commission, claims that the business world is also benefited. See Baer, supra note
38, at 825-26.
111 ANTITRUST Div., DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FY2000 CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET
SUBMISSION 64 (1999), reprinted in Appropriations for 2000: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on the Dep ts of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related
Agencies of the H. Comm. on Appropriations, 106th Cong. 745 (1999) (estimating DOJ-
created savings of $4 billion); The Antitrust Enforcement Agencies: The Bureau of
Competition of the Federal Trade Comm 'n and the Antitrust Div. of the Dep 't of Justice:
Hearing Before the Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 13 (1999) (statement of
Chairman Pitofsky) (estimating FTC-created savings of $1.2 billion).
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process,' 12 and include savings created by the entire premerger notification
process and enforcement mechanism, for example, forced divestitures, it is
likely that the types of benefits discussed above provide at least some utility,
even if the benefits are outweighed by the costs. 113
V. PROBLEMS WITH THE CURRENT SYSTEM
A. Introduction
The exercise of unfettered discretion by the FTC and DOJ exposed
several flaws of HSR: (1) lack of external constraint upon the decision-
making authority of the DOJ and FTC permits overenforcement; (2) lengthy
time delays may effectively prevent a deal from closing, or even from being
proposed; (3) companies incur significant compliance expenses, often in
excess of several million dollars; and (4) receipt of a Second Request may
create disclosure obligations. 114 Depending on one's viewpoint about
judicially crafted antitrust policy, another problem with the current system is
that courts are precluded from reviewing merger proposals that may actually
be procompetitive. Moreover, by utilizing the Second Request as a de facto
injunction, the agencies may have prevented mergers that would ultimately
benefit consumers through increased innovation, increased supply, or lower
prices. 115 Finally, there is likely a deterrent effect that prevents potentially
procompetitive transactions from even being proposed.
B. Lack of External Constraints on the DOJ and FTC
The lack of external constraints upon the DOJ and FTC decision-making
process is one of the most significant flaws of the current Second Request
process because it often leads to and compounds other problems-
burdensome time delays, expenses, and disclosure obligations. Congress and
the judiciary recognized the need for general legislation to combat a broad
112 Because the transactions never closed, they are inherently speculative. Moreover,
the numbers provided by the FTC and DOJ calculated the amount of savings to
consumers; they did not account for the direct and indirect costs imposed upon the
companies. Therefore, the estimates do not provide the net benefit, if any, of the Second
Request process.
113 See Sims & Herman, supra note 10, at 885-99 (discussing the benefits and costs
of the current system, and concluding that the HSR Act is in need of reform).
114 See infra Parts IV.B-E.
115 See United States v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486, 501 (1974) (noting that




category of innovative anticompetitive trade practices."l 6 Consequently, both
the Sherman Act and the Clayton Act were very general pieces of legislative
ambiguity.11 7 Not surprisingly, when the DOJ and FTC were given authority
to enforce the antitrust laws,"18 they quickly claimed as much power as
possible under the statutes. Subsequent congressional compromises" 9 and
internalization of the system by the agencies and companies 120 firmly
established the agencies' practices, thereby leading to the tremendous block
of power currently exercised by the FTC and DOJ-the ability to unilaterally
impose substantive judgment upon a transaction by utilizing the Second
Request process as a de facto injunction, without being subject to judicial
review.
Because of this lack of external constraint, even the Model Second
Request requires submission of a vast amount of detailed information. 12 1
DOJ and FTC staff attorneys have little incentive to modify the Model
Second Request, although they are encouraged to do so, 122 when increased
disclosure and extended periods of review reduce their risk of error and they
are not subject to any external restraints. Consequently, regardless of the
116 See 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2000) (proscribing acquisitions where "the effect of such
acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly");
United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290, 327-42 (1897)
(representing one of the Supreme Court's most expansive views of the term "every" in
Section 1 of the Sherman Act); see also 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000) (condemning "[e]very
contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade
or commerce..."); Grimes, supra note 95, at 940 (discussing the "law of unintended
consequences" applied to HSR, which is described as "overly broad"). When debating the
enactment of the FTC and Clayton Acts, Congress noted the necessity of general
legislation in the Conference Committee Report: "It is impossible to frame definitions
which embrace all unfair practices. There is no limit to human inventiveness in this
field.... If Congress were to adopt the method of definition, it would undertake an
endless task." H.R. REP. No. 63-1142, at 19 (1914).
117 See Grimes, supra note 95, at 940.
118 See supra notes 23-33 and accompanying text.
119 Sims, supra note 109, at 1 (discussing the business community's embrace of
higher initial filing thresholds by Congress, in exchange for postponing Second Request
reform).
120 Sims & Herman, supra note 10, at 883, 888 (recognizing the private nature of
HSR practice because of the prevalence of consent decrees, confidentiality rules, and
dearth of litigation, and predicting a lack of "long-term intelligent policymaking" will
result).
121 See Model Second Request, supra note 69.
122 Guidance, supra note 70, at § V(E)(3) ("Staff should be forthcoming about the
issues of concern. Because the scope of second requests is often broad, staff should be
willing to modify requests that are not likely to be relevant to the investigation or
resolution of staff's concerns.").
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specific transaction's particularities, parties are often required to submit the
following detailed information in response to a Second Request
investigation: (1) organizational charts; (2) personnel directories; (3) lists of
all agents and representatives; (4) products manufactured and/or sold; (5) the
amount of sales in each relevant market area; (6) customer lists; (7) locations
of facilities; (8) promotional materials for each product; (9) market studies;
(10) forecasts; (11) surveys; (12) customer complaints; (13) past and present
lawsuits; (14) federal and state investigations; (15) pricing lists;
(16)competitor lists; (17) descriptions of competitors' products and
facilities; (18) costs of production; (19) potential barriers to entry into the
market; (20) future construction plans; (21)the amount of imports and
exports; (22) membership in trade associations and information services;
(23) other potential transactions involving acquisitions or divestitures;
(24)potential legal ramifications in other areas of law; and (25)the
companies' procedures regarding the maintenance of business records.
123
These submissions are incorporated into the Model Second Request and are
generally required for each Second Request investigation. 124 Moreover,
within each specification, agency staff typically requires detailed breakdowns
of the information. 125 For example, Model Specification 2 requires "a list of
all agents and representatives of the company, including, but not limited to,
all attorneys, consultants, investment bankers, product distributors, sales
agents, and other persons retained by the company in any capacity relating to
any subject and any relevant product covered by this Request .... 126
These broad requests for information are due, at least in part, to a lack of
external constraints upon the DOJ and FTC. This investigative barrage has
enabled the agencies to effectively delay a transaction without being subject
to review. Some have even criticized the agencies for utilizing the Second
Request investigation as a means of achieving nearly unlimited discovery in
preparation for litigation, rather than simply obtaining the information
necessary to make an initial determination as to whether a proposed
transaction has a likelihood of resulting in anticompetitive effects, and then
proceeding with normal discovery procedures. 127 Without judicial oversight
or statutory limitations, the practices are likely to continue. 
128
123 See Model Second Request, supra note 69, at Specifications 1-16.
124 See id.
125 See id.
126 Id. at Specification 2.
127 Sims & Herman, supra note 10, at 868-69.
128 The agencies, after the 2000 amendments to HSR, were required to establish a
procedure for internal review of allegedly overbroad Second Requests. See 15 U.S.C.
§ 18a(e)(1)(B) (2000). The agencies should be commended for establishing these review
[Vol. 67:433
SECOND OPINIONABOUT SECOND REQUESTS
C. Time
Time is of the essence in many, if not all, of the mergers and acquisitions
subject to the HSR filing requirements. 129 Debt-financing, valuation
problems, business operations risks, stock price volatility, and the avoidance
of anti-takeover defenses in a hostile takeover are important reasons for
completing a transaction in a relatively short period of time. 130 The Supreme
Court has explicitly recognized the costs of delay in the context of an
acquisition, as well as congressional intent to restrict the amount of delay
imposed under several of the federal statutes that affect mergers. 13 1 HSR's
sponsors also recognized these factors in 1976 and, accordingly, incorporated
express time limits into the statute to restrict the agencies' ability to review
merger proposals and to make their determination as to whether to formally
procedures by senior officials within the agencies and for continuing review of their
practices; however, the changes do not impose a significant external constraint. In fact,
the effect may be that the agency practices become further entrenched.
129 122 CONG. REc. 30,877 (1976) (statement of Rep. Rodino noting that protracted
delays may effectively "kill" many of these transactions).
130 See Howell, supra note 1, at 1728-29. Transactions subject to the HSR may also
be affected by other legislation, such as the Williams Act of 1933, which also has
statutory waiting periods. See 15 U.S.C. § § 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f) (2000). While they
may impose costs associated with delaying a transaction, the statutory waiting periods
provided in the Williams Act are generally shorter than the HSR waiting periods. See
infra note 138 and accompanying text. If a Second Request is issued, the waiting period
under the HSR can theoretically be extended indefinitely. See infra Part IV.C. As a result,
HSR transactions do not generally incur additional timing delay costs because of the
Williams Act.
131 Edgar v. Mite Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 637 (1982) (holding that an Illinois
antitakeover statute which imposed a statutory waiting period that exceeded the waiting
period provided by the Williams Act was preempted by the federal law). The Court
expressed concern that under the Illinois statute, the Illinois Secretary of State had "the
power to delay a tender offer indefinitely," id, a concern that seems to undercut the
current practices of the FTC and DOJ under the HSR Act. The Court, in striking down
the Illinois statute, stated: "[i]n enacting the Williams Act, Congress itself 'recognized
that delay can seriously impede a tender offer' and sought to avoid it."' Id. (citing Great
Western United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256, 1277 (5th Cir. 1978); S. REP. No. 90-
550, at 4 n. 13 (1967)). Delay has even been characterized as the most important weapon
in a hostile acquisition, that is, where the acquisition is opposed by the target's board of
directors. See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort, State Tender-Offer Legislation. Interests,
Effects, and Political Competency, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 213, 238 (1977); Herbert M.
Wachtell, Special Tender Offer Litigation Tactics, 32 Bus. L. 1433, 1437-42 (1977). The
Edgar Court, even though the case involved preemption of the Illinois statute by the
Williams Act, also noted that Congress reemphasized the consequences of delay in a
transaction when it enacted the HSR Act in 1976. Edgar, 457 U.S. at 638.
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initiate litigation to obtain a court-ordered preliminary injunction. 132 The
key, however, is that the drafters of HSR also felt that the Second Request
process rarely would be used by the agencies, 133 and when it was, that it
would be limited in scope to information that was already prepared by the
companies and readily available for conveyance to the FTC and DOJ without
significant burdens. 134 Once the agencies declared that "substantial
compliance" required full compliance' 35 and that the statutory waiting period
would not begin until a Second Request was fully complied with, 136 the time
limits were effectively eviscerated. Time-sensitive acquisitions that were
originally supposed to be reviewed within a twenty-day period could be
delayed for several months. 137 As of May 2005, receipt of a Second Request
132 See supra notes 61, 67, and accompanying text (describing congressional
testimony about the inclusion of an automatic stay provision in the HSR and the twenty-
day statutory waiting period that was subsequently amended to thirty days).
133 See supra notes 87, 89 and accompanying text (statement of Rep. Rodino
describing the unusual occurrence and limited scope of Second Requests in merger
investigations).
134 See id.
135 16 C.F.R. § 803.20(a)(2) (2005).
136 16 C.F.R. § 803.10 (2005).
137 See James Lowe, US Tightens Net on Merger Reporting: The Hart-Scott-Rodino
Act Has Been the Cornerstone of Merger Control in the US for 25 Years, INT'L FIN. L.
REV., May 1, 2001, at 22 (noting that responses to Second Requests can take anywhere
from several weeks to several months); Dan Wellington, Major Changes to the Hart-
Scott-Rodino Act, TEX. LAW., Apr. 30, 2001, at 44 (declaring that Second Requests can
be a "monstrous demand for documents and information taking months to fulfill"); David
B. Stratton & Barbara T. Sicalides, News at 11: Bankruptcy and Antitrust Law: What You
Don't Know Can Hurt You, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Sept. 2004, at 34 (stating that, because
Second Requests typically include extensive interrogatories, document requests, and
depositions of personnel, it often takes more than six months and several million dollars
to comply with agency requests). Even senior agency officials admit that the Second
Request process often takes months to complete. See, e.g., Richard G. Parker, Dir.
Bureau of Competition, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Prepared Remarks at the Spring 2000
Meeting of the American Bar Association Federal Trade Commission Committee (Apr. 7,
2000), http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/other/rparkerspringaba00.htm (claiming that most
Second Request investigations are completed within four months).
At least one Second Request investigation lasted nearly an entire year before a
consent decree was entered. See Sims & McFalls, supra note 12, at 935 (providing the
AOL/Time Warner investigation as an example of the DOJ and FTC's current practice
under the HSR). Sims represented America Online, Inc., in the combination with Time
Warner. Id. at 938 n.14. See also In re America Online, Inc., No. C-3989, 2001 FTC
LEXIS 44 (Apr. 17, 2001). Sims claims that, given the legal theories and facts involved
in the transaction, "the FTC almost certainly would have failed to obtain injunctive relief
necessary to prevent the merger." Sims & McFalls, supra note 12, at 940 n. 16. Moreover,
even if a transaction survives a Second Request investigation, parties are often coerced
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prolongs agency review by an average of six months.' 38 Extremely complex
deals, however, can require more than a year for parties to comply with a
Second Request. 139
D. Direct Expenses
Another consequence of the Second Request process, somewhat related
to delays in completing a transaction, is the cost of complying with an
investigation. On average, compliance with Second Requests costs merger
parties $5 million; however, it is not uncommon for complex transactions to
result in compliance costs upwards of $20 million. 140 For example, the
Exxon-Mobil merger reportedly cost one of the parties more than $30 million
to comply with the agency's Second Request. 14 1
Many of the common expenses associated with a response include
research, compilation, and duplication expenses. 142 In some cases, electronic
production is the biggest expense because companies are "paying for
sophisticated document-scanning and management software and the people
to run it, or installing dedicated high-speed data connections to regulators'
offices in order to transfer information."'143 Companies may even rent
expensive warehouse space to store the documents and provide access to
agency staff, "even though much of it ends up boxed and unread by the
agencies that demanded it."'144 It is not uncommon for the filings to entail the
production of thousands of boxes loaded with documents, with one case
reportedly requiring over 8,000 document boxes, which were later returned
to the company largely unopened after the investigation was completed. 145
Another example of a burdensome Second Request is McCormick &
Co.'s attempted purchase of Spice Island's assets. The FTC expressed
anticompetitive concerns about the deal after receiving the initial HSR
into agreeing to overreaching remedies because prolonged litigation would cost "(1) more
months of delay and (2) likely a significant interim market penalty." Id. at 938.
138 Cecile Kohrs Lindell, Majoras Hopes to Streamline Reviews, THE DAILY DEAL,
May 11, 2005 (noting that the FTC's new chairman is seeking to reform the Second
Request process and providing the average time and cost for complying with a Second
Request).
1391[d.
140 Id.; see also Sims & Herman, supra note 10, at 890-92.
141 Cecile Kohrs Lindell, When Once Is Not Enough, THE DAILY DEAL, Apr. 25,
2005 (noting that "[a] corporate merger is rarely a cakewalk, but there are two little
words that can make it immeasurably harder: 'a second request"').
142 Sims & Herman, supra note 10, at 890-92.
143 Lindell, supra note 141.
144 Id
145 Sims & Herman, supra note 10, at 886. Further details are not provided.
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premerger notice and, therefore, issued a Second Request to the parties. 146
When McCormick & Co. attempted to proceed with the acquisition, the FTC
sought a court-ordered preliminary injunction.' 47 The FTC claimed, despite
receiving over 120,000 pages of documents from McCormick & Co., that the
company had not substantially complied with the Second Request. 148 Facing
increased scrutiny, the deal was abandoned.
1 49
Second Request compliance expenses also commonly include salaries of
employees, including high-ranking executives, and attorneys' fees.
150
Executives must often spend large amounts of time producing documents,
responding to interrogatories, and testifying at depositions.15' Moreover,
given the administratively heavy nature of the Second Request process, large
sums of money are spent on attorneys' fees to encourage expeditious
compliance with the law and negotiation of acceptable remedies should the
DOJ or FTC continue to have anticompetitive concerns as the investigation
progresses. 152 As a result, it is not uncommon for firms to spend several
million dollars responding to an investigation. 153
E. Continuous Disclosure
Finally, the Second Request process may create significant disclosure
obligations for the parties involved. Before a company can substantially
comply with a Second Request investigation, the agencies generally demand
that all materially relevant information-which the agencies tend to interpret
very broadly 154 -be made available to the agency staff as soon as it develops
or is created.' 55 Item N of the Model Second Request states:
This request shall be deemed continuing in nature so as to require
production of all documents responsive to any specification included in this
Request produced or obtained by the company up to thirty calendar days
prior to the date of the company's full compliance with this Request,
146 FTC v. McCormick & Co., 1988-1 Trade Cases (CCH) para. 67,976 (D.D.C.
1988); ARTHUR FLEISCHER, JR. & ALEX SUSSMAN, TAKEOVER DEFENSE § 12.05(c), at 38
(Supp. 2001).
147 McCormiCk, 1988-1 Trade Cases (CCH) at para. 67,976.
148 See FLEISCHER & SUSSMAN, supra note 146.
149 Id.
150 See Stratton & Sicalides, supra note 137, at 34.
151 Id
152 See id.
153 See Lindell, supra note 138.
154 See supra Part IV.B.
155 See Model Second Request, supra note 69, at Item N.
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except: (1) for documents responsive to Specification 7 or Specification 15,
for which the date is fourteen calendar days prior to the date of the
company's full compliance with this Request; and (2) for documents that
must be translated into English, for which the date is forty-five calendar
days prior to the date of the company's full compliance with this
Request. 156
Failure to comply with the continuous disclosure obligation prevents the
Second Request investigation from concluding, thereby tolling
commencement of the statutory waiting period,157 possibly subjects the
parties to a civil fine of up to $10,000 per day, 158 and may increase the
scrutiny of the agencies and the likelihood of them seeking injunctive relief
to halt the transaction.
Receipt of a Second Request may also give rise to a duty to disclose its
receipt to the public under the federal securities laws, because of the
tremendous ramifications of receiving further investigation and its relatively
high correlation with a transaction being officially challenged by the
agencies. 159 Although the antitrust agencies themselves are clearly prohibited
from disclosing a pending merger or its terms, nothing prevents the SEC
from declaring the receipt of a Second Request to be material. 160 If the SEC
made this declaration and a public company received a Second Request, the
securities laws would then require the company to file an 8-K with the SEC,
156 Id.
157 See 16 C.F.R. § 803.10 (2005); 15 U.S.C. § 18a(b) (2000).
158 15 U.S.C. § 18a(g) (2000) (providing a civil penalty for HSR violations).
159 Robert S. Schlossberg and Harry T. Robins, Hart-Scott-Rodino Merger
Investigations: A Guide for Safeguarding Business Secrets, 56 Bus. LAW 943, 953 (2001)
(stating that the duty to disclose the receipt of a Second Request depends on the facts and
circumstances of a particular transaction). When the information would be relied upon by
investors to make a buy or sell decision, a public announcement is generally required. Id.
Because the issuance of a Second Request is highly correlated with a transaction being
abandoned, resulting in a consent decree (that often requires divestiture of significant
assets), or formal litigation, see Grimes, supra note 95, at 965 & tbl. 1, it is likely that an
investor would rely on the information, thereby giving rise to a duty to disclose. Grimes
notes that in recent years "well over 50% of second requests have led to enforcement
action by the agency." Id. In Table 1, Grimes shows that, in the years 1998-2002, out of
188 Second Request investigations by the FTC, 44 transactions were permitted to
proceed without modification, 39 transactions were abandoned by the parties, 87 were
settled through consent decrees involving either restructuring of the companies or
divestiture, and 18 proceeded to litigation. Id. at tbl. 1.
160 Jaret Seiberg, Uneven Ground, THE DAILY DEAL, Jan. 11, 2005 (noting that
material events require companies to file an 8-K with the SEC and that "materiality" is
often an elusive concept).
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which typically is accompanied by a press release.161 As a result, the HSR
process may give rise to disclosure obligations to both the agencies and the
public, further increasing the costs of compliance.
V. A METHOD FOR AVOIDING THE DE FACTO INJUNCTION?
Occasionally, companies that have received a Second Request embark on
a risky venture to avoid a de facto injunction. For example, in Oracle's bid to
acquire PeopleSoft, Inc. in 2004, Oracle CEO Larry Ellison provided certain
information to the FTC in response to a Second Request, certified substantial
compliance pursuant to the regulations promulgated under HSR, 162 and then
announced Oracle's intention to consummate the transaction in the near
future. 163 This method forced the FTC to proceed to court and seek a
preliminary injunction against Oracle, 164 or risk losing the preservation of an
adequate remedy because Oracle and PeopleSoft would become inextricably
intertwined. This effectively circumvented the de facto injunction and forced
the FTC to justify its position before a neutral arbiter (the judiciary);
however, this approach is extremely risky. Not only are the companies
certain to incur litigation costs, but they are also subject to a fine of up to
$10,000 per day for HSR violations. 165 Fines occasionally reach several
million dollars.166
Another recent attempt by companies to avoid a Second Request de facto
injunction involved Blockbuster's attempt to acquire Hollywood
Entertainment Corporation (Hollywood). 167 On December 28, 2004,
Blockbuster announced its intention to purchase all of the outstanding shares
of Hollywood through a cash tender offer and also filed its premerger
Notification and Report Form. 168 The FTC, on January 12, 2005, issued a
161 Id.
162 See 16 C.F.R. § 803.6 (2004) (requiring certification of compliance with Second
Requests).
163 See Defendant Oracle Corp.'s Statement re Disputed Issues, United States v.
Oracle Corp., No. C. 04-0807 VRW (N.D. Cal. Mar. 8, 2004).
164 United States v. Oracle Corp., 331 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1175-76 (N.D. Cal. 2004)
(holding that the government failed to show "by a preponderance of the evidence that the
merger of Oracle and PeopleSoft is likely substantially to lessen competition" and, thus,
denying injunctive relief).
165 15 U.S.C. § 18a(g) (2000).
166 See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
167 Fed. Trade Comm'n, FTC Seeks Court Order to Force Blockbuster to Comply
with Premerger Rules (Mar. 4, 2005), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2005/03/blockbuster.htm; see also Complaint, supra note 17.
16 8 Id at 3-4.
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Second Request to Blockbuster to obtain additional information regarding
potential antitrust issues.169 A dispute arose regarding compliance with
Specification 17 of the Second Request, which required data from each
Blockbuster store relating to "pricing, non-price terms, incentive programs,
late fees, membership fees, discounts, and other benefits offered to
customers." 170 Blockbuster provided some information in response to the
Specification, but the FTC claimed that there were significant problems with
Blockbuster's electronic submission. 171 The FTC asserted that a great deal of
information provided to the agency was "incorrect" due to "programming
error[s]" of Blockbuster 172 and estimated that, based on the amount of data
contained in Blockbuster's additional submissions, the original submission
omitted information regarding approximately 4,200 of the company's 4,600
stores. 173 Blockbuster disputed the accuracy and omission of information
and, therefore, certified compliance with the Second Request.174 Despite two
notices of deficiency being sent by the FTC to Blockbuster asserting that the
company did not substantially comply with the Second Request, 175
Blockbuster publicly announced "its intention to effect its proposed
acquisition of Hollywood as soon as possible, indicating that unless the
Commission takes action by mid-March Blockbuster will go ahead with its
acquisition and force the Commission to bring suit to stop the transaction. 176
Given the February 4, 2005 certification of compliance date, Blockbuster
could consummate the transaction on March 8, 2005, if injunctive relief from
the courts was not granted. 177 However, the FTC sought injunctive relief
from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia on March
4, 2005, and an Agreed Order was entered on March 9, 2005, extending the
HSR waiting period until March 21, 2005.178 The tactic circumvented the
169 Id. at 5-6.
170 Id.
171 Id. at 6-7.
172 Id. at6.
173 Complaint, supra note 17, at 7.
174 Id. at 5-6. Blockbuster's Vice President and Senior Corporate Counsel, Judy C.
Norris, certified compliance with the Second Request for the company. Id.
175 Id. at 8-9.
176 Id. at 9-10.
17 7 Id. at 10.
178 Complaint, supra note 17, at 1; Agreed Order Regarding Extension of Hart-
Scott-Rodino Waiting Period, FTC v. Blockbuster, Inc., No.: 1:05 CV 00464 (D.D.C.
Mar. 9, 2005); see also Federal Trade Commission, Blockbuster to Comply with FTC's




imposition of a de facto injunction, at least temporarily, but ultimately
resulted in an extension of the waiting period.
VI. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
After reviewing the costs and benefits of the current Second Request
process, many scholars and practitioners agree that the HSR provisions are in
need of at least some reform. 179 Recent administrative changes 180 should be,
and have been, commended for alleviating some of the burdens associated
with the Second Request process; however, more reform is needed because
the power to impose a de facto injunction remains in the good faith and
unfettered discretion of the agencies, without any neutral, external
constraints. Three possibilities for reform are: (1) expressly limiting the
scope of information available in a Second Request investigation;
(2) requiring the agencies to initiate formal litigation within a limited time
period; and (3) creating a streamlined process of judicial review by an
independent panel of experts.
A. Limiting the Scope of Information
Statutory limitations upon the information available in a Second Request
investigation would likely reduce the burdens upon companies; however, it
would seriously undermine the agencies' ability to conduct merger reviews
effectively. As a result, antitrust enforcement would be both overinclusive
and underinclusive. Because the FTC and DOJ are required to investigate
anticompetitive issues in a variety of contexts, 181 limitations upon the type of
179 See Sims & Herman, supra note 10, at 880-84 (criticizing the HSR on several
different fronts). But see, Baer, supra note 38, at 825-62 (defending the current
practices).
180 The FTC, in 2002, adopted a series of "Best Practices" that help alleviate the
burdens of Second Request investigations by providing guidelines to parties and agency
staff about the issuance of, and compliance with, a Second Request. Fed. Trade Comm'n,
Statement of the Federal Trade Commission's Bureau of Competition on Guidelines for
Merger Investigations, Dec. 11, 2002, available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/12/bcguidelines021211.htm. The DOJ adopted similar
guidelines in 2000. Press Release, DOJ, Antitrust Division Announces Merger Review
Process Improvements, Apr. 2000, available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/pressreleases/2000/451 1.pdf; see also ANTITRUST DIv.,
DOJ, REPORT TO CONGRESS REGARDING MERGER REVIEW PROCEDURES (2001), available
at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/8550.pdf (discussing the implementation
and results of the DOJ reforms).
181 For example, antitrust agencies are increasingly required to consider antitrust
concerns on an international basis. Debra A. Valentine, Cross-Border Canada/U.S.
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information available would almost certainly result in inadequacies at least
occasionally. As a result, an increasing number of anticompetitive
transactions would be able to slip through the cracks undetected.
On the other hand, limiting disclosure may also result in overprosecution
by the agencies because they would likely attempt to minimize their risk of
error. Thus, they would often initiate litigation in questionable cases and
continue through at least discovery, which is widely recognized as an
expensive process. 182 Because the risk of under- and overinclusiveness
associated with limiting the scope of information available to the companies
would likely outweigh any savings, this seems to be an unlikely method of
reform.
B. Limiting the Time Period for Deciding Whether to Challenge a
Transaction
Statutory limitations upon the time period for determining whether to
formally challenge a transaction would also substantially decrease the
amount of uncertainty and cost that pervades a Second Request investigation.
An express statutory provision that requires the FTC and DOJ to make their
determination within thirty or sixty days would certainly be more succinct
than the current process.183
Similar to a limitation upon the scope of additional information that can
be requested, however, the system would almost inevitably result in over-
and underinclusiveness because the agencies would be forced to make their
decisions on an expedited pace. As noted by Rep. Rodino when HSR was
originally enacted, these are often extremely complex deals. 184 Because the
economic analysis necessary to evaluate these deals would likely take more
time as the complexity of transactions increases, the agencies would face a
higher risk of error in pursuing injunctive relief. Moreover, it is also likely
that a statutory maximum would, in practice, be used as a statutory minimum
to which every deal would be subjected.
VII. EXPEDITED JUDICIAL REVIEW BY A PANEL OF EXPERTS
To remedy the problems with the current HSR Second Request practice,
Congress should create a streamlined process of review by an independent
Cooperation in Investigations and Enforcement Actions, 26 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 271, 272
(2000) (estimating that, in the year 2000, one half of the Second Request investigations
conducted by the FTC involved a foreign-based party, had important evidence located
abroad, or implicated the divestiture of a foreign asset).
182 See Sims & Herman, supra note 10, at 898.
183 See supra Part II.B.3.
184 See supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text.
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panel of experts. A similar proposal was briefly considered during the
negotiations and deliberations of the 2000 HSR amendments, but was
ultimately discarded. 185 Senator Hatch's amendment provided for judicial
review of Second Requests issued by the agencies, but the provision was
quickly abandoned by proponents of HSR reform 186 and the business
world 187 to obtain more immediate relief for a larger number of transactions
through larger initial filing thresholds. 188
In crafting a system ofjudicial review, the costs currently associated with
HSR must be considered, as litigation itself is often time consuming and
costly. 189 As a result, the following are key components of the proposed
judicial review process: (1) an expedited period of review to ensure timely
determination of the proper scope of the Second Request; (2) review by a
panel of experts focused on antitrust litigation to properly balance concerns
of the agencies and companies within the expedited timeframe; and (3) a
burden of producing "clear and convincing" evidence that the Second
Request issued by the DOJ or FTC is unreasonably burdensome on the
merging companies to limit the amount of challenges and the corresponding
costs of litigation. The process could also require the agencies, upon issuing
a Second Request, to provide a detailed statement containing the factual,
theoretical, and legal bases for requiring additional information. 190 For
example, the European Union currently requires its merger enforcement
agency, the Commission of the European Community, to provide this
information before conducting a "Second Phase" investigation-the
185 S. 1854, 106th Cong. (1999); see Michael F. Urbanski & James R. Creekmore,
Annual Survey of Virginia Law: Antitrust and Trade Regulation Law, 34 U. RICH. L. REv.
647, 679 (2000) (discussing the proposed amendment that would have created a process
for judicial review, albeit without any provisions for review by a panel of neutral experts,
which would be an important facet of any review procedure given the complexity of
antitrust analysis and the expedited period of review that would likely result from any
reform, or heightened burdens of proof placed upon the defendant to challenge the
issuance of a Second Request); see also Sims & McFalls, supra note 12, at 940 n.15
(criticizing the amendment because of the costs associated with litigation that would
ensue because of the proposal's lack of restrictions); Sims, supra note 109, at 1-2
(discussing the Hatch Amendment).
186 Id. at 1-2.
187 Id.
188 See 15 U.S.C. § 18a(a) (2000); Sims, supra note 109, at 1-2.
189 See supra note 182 and accompanying text.
190 See Dimitri Giotakos, GE/Honeywell: A Theoretic Bundle Assessing
Conglomerate Mergers Across the Atlantic, 23 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 469, 507-08
(2002) (discussing the similarities and differences in merger enforcement between the
United States and the European Union, including the importance of detailed factual
statements as a useful tool to decrease burdens on the parties).
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European Union's equivalent of the Second Request. 19 1 This would enable
the merging corporations to more accurately assess the likelihood of
successfully challenging a Second Request under the proposed solution,
thereby mitigating litigation expenses and the use of judicial resources.
A. Expedited Review
Expedited review must be a cornerstone of any effective Second Request
reform because many of the costs associated with the process are caused by
substantial delay in the effectuation of a merger.192 Because of the indefinite
time delays inherent in a Second Request, merging companies often succumb
to the pressure applied by the enforcement agencies and enter consent
decrees that would otherwise be rejected if there had been a neutral arbiter
monitoring the process. 193 Apparently, much of the business world currently
views the forced divestiture of significant portions of their business as more
attractive than spending enormous amounts of time and money achieving
substantial compliance with a Second Request when the probable result is an
enforcement action.194 Consequently, any proposal should minimize time
delays.
Internal review of a Second Request's scope is currently available within
both the DOJ and FTC from a senior official not directly supervising the
particular transaction.' 95 While this process is seldom, if ever, used by parties
in a merger 196 (possibly because they lack faith, rightly or wrongly, in the
objectivity of officials within the agency whose action is being
191 Id. (citing Council Regulation 4064/89 EEC of 21 Dec. 1989 on the Control of
Concentrations Between Undertakings, 1990 O.J. (L 257) 13, 17, amended by Council
Regulation 1310/97 EC of June 30, 1997, 1998 O.J. (L 180) 6(1)(c)).
192 See supra Part IV.C. and accompanying text.
193 See Sims & McFalls, supra note 12, at 938 (noting that parties often accept
consent decrees that are more intrusive than would have been accepted with external
constraints upon the agencies).
194 See Thomas B. Leary, The Essential Stability of Merger Policy in the United
States, 70 ANTITRUST L.J. 105, 137-38 (2002) (providing tables that show the number of
reported HSR transactions, Second Requests, and enforcement actions that took place
each year from 1981 to 2000). The statistics show that in the year 2000, out of 4749 HSR
transactions reported, 98 of these transactions involved the issuance of a Second Request.
Id. Of these 98 transactions involving a Second Request investigation, 80 resulted in an
enforcement action-approximately 81.6%. Id.
195 15 U.S.C. § 18a(e) (2000).
196 James F. Rill et al., International Antitrust: Are Fixed Time Periods for Merger
Review a Good Idea?, INT'L FIN. L. REv., COMPETITION AND ANTITRUST 13, 17 (Supp.
2002) ("Not surprisingly the appeal process has been used sparingly-and with little
success-by parties.").
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questioned), 197 the expedited schedule of review provided in the regulations
serves as a basis for the proposed judicial review. It should involve a series
of compacted periods for submitting complaints of overly burdensome
requests, responses by the appropriate government agency, and review by the
panel. Internal reform by the DOJ created a five-day response period for
responding to requests for modifications to alleged unreasonably burdensome
requests. 198 Discussions regarding modification of a request, however, may
take additional time depending on the complexity of issues involved.199 The
FTC made similar changes within its Second Request framework as well,
with senior officials reviewing and responding to Second Request
modification complaints on an expedited pace.200 These compacted periods
of review are necessary to minimize extended delay of the merger review
process and, therefore, should be incorporated into legislative reforms.
B. Panel of Antitrust Experts
Antitrust law has an evolutionary character due to its reliance on
developing economic theories. 201 As experience has clearly demonstrated,
economic theories are constantly being adjusted for various reasons,202
including changing business practices, technological advancement,
deregulation of certain industries, and the establishment of a global
197 Sims & Herman, supra note 10, at 889 (criticizing the FTC and DOJ for their
drastically different approach taken in cases that are not reportable under HSR and,
therefore, lack the ability to issue a Second Request). Sims & Herman claim that outside
the HSR context, when the agencies are forced to seek a Civil Investigative Demand
(CID) or subpoena to obtain additional information, as opposed to a Second Request,
agencies are much less aggressive. According to them, "[t]his alone shows that appeal to
an agency supervisor, no matter how reasonable, is no substitute for appeal to a neutral
arbiter." Id.
198 DOJ Report to Congress, supra note 180.
199 Id.
200 Statement of the Federal Trade Commission, supra note 180.
201 William E. Kovacic & Carl Shapiro, Antitrust Policy: A Century of Economic
and Legal Thinking, 14 J. ECON. PERSP. 43, 43-60 (2000) (detailing the presence of
economic analysis in antitrust law since the enactment of the Sherman Act in 1890);
Kovacic, supra note 22, at 850-51 (2001) (discussing the importance of economic
analysis).
202 Dennis W. Carlton, A General Analysis of Exclusionary Conduct and Refusal to
Deal-Why Aspen and Kodak Are Misguided, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 659, 680 (2001) (noting
that economic theories tend to evolve slowly as economists more accurately assess
different economic influences over time).
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market. 20 3 Because of these changes, reliance upon economists and other
experts is extremely important and commonplace in antitrust cases 204 to
determine at least two central considerations: (1)the relevant commercial
market, and (2) the existence of efficiencies that may save an otherwise
problematic activity from violation of the antitrust laws. 205
Instead of limiting the assistance of experts to testimonial analysis of
particular facts in a litigated case, a panel of antitrust experts should be
created to make the limited determination of whether a Second Request is
unreasonably burdensome given the particular circumstances of a deal, such
as the industry involved. Federal judges and magistrates currently preside
over antitrust issues, as well as determine the proper scope of discovery
under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; however, they may be ill-
equipped to provide the expedient review necessary for effective HSR
reform. The judiciary has been shielded from reviewing Second Requests
since the requests' creation in 1976, thereby limiting its experience with the
process. Moreover, because the agencies' use of the Second Request process
helped cause privatization of merger and acquisition law, 206 challengers of
Second Requests may be hesitant to place the corporations' future in the
capable, but inexperienced, hands of outsiders. 20 7
Economists, members of the business community, industry experts,
former agency employees, corporate counsel, and similar experts, on the
other hand, provide valuable insider knowledge and practical experience. By
selecting individuals from each of these groups to comprise a panel of expertjudges, this knowledge and experience will enable the panel to make accurate
decisions on an expedited time schedule, without imposing a larger burden
upon federal district court judges and magistrates. 208 Not only are these
203 Kovacic, supra note 22, at 846 ("Performing the predictive exercise can be
especially difficult in sectors featuring rapid change as a result of technological
dynamism, deregulation, or globalization.").
204 See, e.g., New York v. Kraft General Foods, Inc., 926 F. Supp. 321 (S.D.N.Y.
1995); In re High Fructose Corn Syrup, 295 F.3d 651 (2002); United States v. United
Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953).
205 Kovacic & Shapiro, supra note 20 1, at 43-60.
206 See Grimes, supra note 95 and accompanying text.
207 Sims & Herman, supra note 10, at 889-90.
208 A similar approach was briefly entertained to "review the process of second-
request formulation and compliance," but was directed at merger assessment by an
economic expert that was "not... at the discretion of or subject to selection by the
district court." Abbot B. Lipsky, Jr., Antitrust Economics-Making Progress, Avoiding
Regression, 12 GEO. MASON L. REv. 163, 176 (2003). Lipsky expresses concern about
the institutional formats used to provide economic evidence and suggests several reforms
to improve the costs and accuracy of economic testimony. Id.
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individuals, like federal judges, intimately aware of the evolving antitrust
doctrine, they also have experienced the frustrations, time delays, expenses,
and disclosure obligations inherent in the Second Request process. The
collective wisdom of a panel of antitrust practitioners will effectuate a
pragmatic and balanced approach to investigations, as Congress originally
intended. The panel would be sensitive to informational demands of the
administrative agencies by recognizing the need for certain disclosures to
make an informed and accurate decision to proceed with litigation or to
permit the transaction. It would also be receptive to present concerns of the
business community, because the experience of the panel would enable it to
review a Second Request on an expedited basis, thereby limiting any
unnecessary chills upon merger proposals.
C. Clear and Convincing Standard of Review
While the first two elements of this proposal reduce the overall burden of
compliance with a Second Request on companies, the third element-
requiring the complainant companies to prove that the issued Second Request
is unreasonably burdensome by clear and convincing evidence-maintains
the agencies' ability to obtain necessary information without being
continually subjected to meritless claims. The importance of providing
accurate and sufficient information to the FTC and DOJ to make their
decisions is unquestioned. The expected result and the current state of affairs
is that the agencies use (or abuse) the process for purposes other than a brief
review of merger proposals.20 9 Because of the litigation expenses associated
with any judicial review and the possibility of heavy-handed judicial
oversight, complainants will likely consider the merits of their claims;
however, a clear and convincing standard of review will encourage firms to
reserve the judicial review process for only the most offensive cases.21
0
209 Sims & Herman, supra note 10, at 868-69 (noting that the agencies are able to
use the Second Request process to obtain "essentially unlimited precomplaint discovery"
along with a great deal of bargaining leverage due to their ability to delay the transaction
at will).
210 One criticism of this proposal may be that the DOJ and FTC lack the financial
wherewithal to litigate these reviews in a court. While this is possible, it is unlikely,
because the agencies would avoid spending extended periods of time negotiating a
modified Second Request, agency staff would most likely represent the agencies in court
instead of requiring senior officials within the agency to review contested Second
Requests as the statute currently mandates, and the expedited and limited nature of the
proposal minimizes the administrative burdens that implementation of the proposal would
entail. Even assuming that the agencies would require more funding if the proposal were
adopted, the current system of funding antitrust enforcement through the filing fees of the




The HSR provisions, specifically those concerning the Second Request
investigation, are in need of reform. Contrary to the original intent of
Congress, the administrative agencies exploit the procedural mechanism to
unilaterally regulate substantive merger issues without being constrained by a
neutral arbiter. While recent internal reforms in the DOJ and FTC, both
voluntary and statutorily-mandated, improved the process, the system lacks
the institutional protection of the judiciary to prevent abuse by the agencies
in order to gain bargaining leverage and unlimited precomplaint discovery.
Moreover, companies that receive Second Requests are still faced with
indefinite time delays, compliance costs, and disclosure obligations because
the requests can require duplication and production of thousands of
documents, over several months, costing millions of dollars.211 Because of
these burdens, companies subject to Second Request investigations, such as
Oracle and Blockbuster, may take substantial risks by providing some
documentation in response to a Second Request, certifying compliance, then
announcing their intent to proceed with the transaction. At $10,000 per day
for a violation, it is an extremely risky venture for combating the perceived
exploitation of the Second Request process by the agencies.
Legislative reform, therefore, is necessary to reduce the structural
imbalance of the HSR Second Request investigation. Three possible reforms
include: (1) limiting the scope of information that may be requested in a
Second Request; (2) limiting the time period that the DOJ and FTC are given
to make a decision as to whether to proceed with formal litigation; and
(3) providing expedited review by a panel of antitrust experts. Because the
first two possibilities would often result in both over- and underenforcement
of the antitrust laws and would fail to properly balance the needs of the
agencies and companies involved, Congress should develop a streamlined
review process by a panel of experts to address the problems. Expedited
review, expert judges, and a clear and convincing burden of proof should be
incorporated as the cornerstones of the reform in order to balance the
governmental need for information and the justifiable concerns of the
inappropriate. Reauthorization of the Federal Trade Commission: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Consumer Affairs, Foreign Commerce and Tourism of the S. Comm. of
Commerce, Science, and Transp., 106th Cong. 1088 (2000) (statement of Comm'r Leary)("Ideally, agency funding would be decoupled from filing fees entirely.").
211 Stratton & Sicalides, supra note 137; Committee on Antitrust & Trade
Regulation, Supplement to the 2002 Milton Handler Annual Antitrust Review
Proceedings: Recent Developments in Four Areas of Antitrust Law: Merger
Enforcement; Criminal Enforcement and Health Care Initiatives; Exclusionary Conduct,
and the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine and State Action Immunity, 2003 COLUM. Bus. L.
REv. 451,456-58 (2003).
2006]
468 OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL [Vol. 67:433
business community. As a body of case law develops, the system will
recognize increases in efficiency through increased transparency in the scope
of permissible requests, the time and costs necessary to achieve substantial
compliance with the Second Request will be decreased, and, most
importantly, there will be an external constraint on the implementation of de
facto injunctions by the agencies, thereby restoring the original purpose of
the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act.
